DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURE-RELATED LOAN DEFAULT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
This paper investigates agriculture-related loan default in 2002–2009 through a largedata set from a leading Chinese state-owned bank. Using logit regression, we findthe default rate on agriculture-related loans is significantly higher than that on non–agriculture-related loans. We find that base interest rates, loan maturity, the typeof collateral, firm size, ownership structure, and managerial quality rating have asignificant impact on agriculture-related loan default, but this also depends on howagriculture-related loans are defined. The results provide insight into the real impactof monetary policy on agriculture-related lending.
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